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Medical decisions will often entail a broad search for relevant information. No sources
alone may offer a complete picture, and many may be selective in their presentation.
This selectivity may induce forgetting for previously learned material, thereby adversely
affecting medical decision-making. In the study phase of two experiments, participants
learned information about a fictitious disease and advantages and disadvantages of four
treatment options. In the subsequent practice phase, they read a pamphlet selectively
presenting either relevant (Experiment 1) or irrelevant (Experiment 2) advantages or dis-
advantages. A final cued recall followed and, in Experiment 2, a decision as to the best
treatment for a patient. Not only did reading the pamphlet induce forgetting for related
and unmentioned information, the induced forgetting adversely affected decision-making.
The research provides a cautionary note about the risks of searching through selectively
presented information when making a medical decision.
Keywords: memory accessibility, retrieval-induced forgetting, medical information
INTRODUCTION
Medical decisions, like many other kinds of decisions, will often
entail a broad search for a wide range of relevant information.
When deciding which treatment option to pursue, people might
visit one or more doctor(s), scan the Internet, talk to friends and
acquaintances, and acquire and carefully peruse relevant brochures
and other printed material. Given the commercial and often biased
nature of many sources of information, as well as time con-
straints faced by the investigator, the received information might
highlight some facts, while limiting easy access to other, equally
relevant ones (Simon, 1985; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). For
instance, the Pfizer website for Lipitor (Lipitor Official Website,
2006) (http://www.lipitor.com) describes the drug’s side effects
and precautions only in a side bar or in a manner that demands
that the viewer scrolls down to the bottom of the web page. We
are interested here in how selective presentation of information
affects the subsequent accessibility of the “unmentioned” items.
Moreover, we want to explore whether any shift in accessibility
potentially influences medical decisions.
In many instances, medical decisions are best characterized as
based on memory for the “gist” of acquired information (Reyna
and Lloyd, 2006). For instance, people often fail to remember
the exact figures provided about the risk of a medical procedure,
even though they may remember the “general” pattern (Reyna
and Hamilton, 2001). Providing the gist about the relative risk of
different treatment options can be more effective than providing
precise information (for a review, see Reyna, 2008).
In some situations, however, access to precise information may
be desirable for the medical decision-maker. When deciding what
citrus fruit to have at breakfast, decision-makers may be at an
advantage if they know precisely that navel and Valencia oranges
are allowable if taking Lipitor, but not Cara Cara oranges or grape-
fruit. Knowing simply that some citrus fruits are allowable may not
be sufficient. In such situations, knowing and accessing specific
information might become critical for making effective judgments
and decisions (see Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Lynch and Srull, 1982;
Feldman and Lynch, 1988; Johnson et al., 2007; see also Tversky
and Kahneman, 1973; Menon and Raghubir, 2003).
The present study, then, addresses two issues: how does selec-
tive exposure to relevant medical information affect mnemonic
accessibility? And in instances in which precise information is
needed, does any shift in mnemonic accessibility influence medical
decision-making? We focus on situations in which the decision-
maker is first exposed to information on the treatments suitable
for a disease and then re-exposed to a selective rendering of those
treatments, as might be the case when a patient turns to the Inter-
net to follow-up on the discussion they had with their doctor. With
such re-exposures, even if time constraints do not prevent a com-
plete and exhaustive search, there might nevertheless be selectivity,
in that, as noted, all the relevant information encountered initially
might not easily be found during an Internet search. Our interest
is not in the practice effects one might expect to find with re-
exposure, but in the forgetting that might occur when information
goes unmentioned.
There are several reasons why forgetting might occur when pre-
viously known information goes unmentioned. First, the unmen-
tioned information might decay if not rehearsed (Wixted, 2004).
Second, and more critical for the present study, individuals
might be induced to forget the unmentioned information if it
is related to mentioned information. As the large literature on
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retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) suggests, when people selec-
tively practice previously studied material, they are more likely to
forget unpracticed memories related to the practiced material than
unpracticed, unrelated memories (Anderson et al., 1994).
The standard RIF paradigm includes three experimental phases:
a study phase, a selective practice phase, and a final recall phase. In
the study phase participants study category-exemplars pairs such
as: fruit-apple, fruit-banana, clothes-dress, clothes-shirt. A selec-
tive practice phase follows where participants are instructed to
complete stems for half of the exemplars from half of the cate-
gories: fruit-a____, but not fruit-banana, nor any of the clothes
items. This selective practice creates three types of items, depend-
ing on the retrieval status of each studied item: (1) items that
were selectively practiced (Rp+: fruit-apple), (2) items that were
unpracticed, but related to the practiced ones (Rp−: fruit-banana),
and (3) items that were unpracticed and unrelated to those prac-
ticed (Nrp: clothes-dress; clothes-shirt ). Finally, participants are
asked to recall all exemplars from all categories presented in the
study phase. The recall proportion measured in the final recall
phase reveals both a practice effect for practiced items (that is,
the recall proportion of Rp+ items larger than the recall propor-
tion of Nrp items), but, more importantly for this paper, RIF is
observed for the unpracticed, related material (that is, the recall
proportion of Rp− items smaller than the recall proportion of
Nrp items). If RIF were merely a matter of decay, the unpracticed
memories related to the retrieved materials should be forgotten at
the same rate as unpracticed memories unrelated to the retrieved
material. In order to account for the observed RIF pattern, many
researchers have argued that the retrieval of a desired memory
will produce response competition from related memories, which
must be inhibited if retrieval of the desired memory is to be suc-
cessful (for a review, see Anderson and Levy, 2007; Storm and Levy,
2012). This inhibition lingers, producing the pattern of forgetting
associated with RIF (for an alternative account, see Dodd et al.,
2006).
Retrieval-induced forgetting is relevant to our present concerns
because it can occur not only when probed individuals themselves
selectively and overtly remember (within-individual RIF, or WI-
RIF), but also when probed individuals attend to others remem-
bering (socially shared RIF, SS-RIF; Cuc et al., 2007; Coman et al.,
2009; Stone et al., 2010; Coman and Hirst, 2012; Hirst and Echter-
hoff, 2012). Hirst and his colleagues claim that SS-RIF occurs
because attendees concurrently retrieve with the rememberer, and,
as a result, find themselves also selectively remembering. In some
instances of SS-RIF, the source of the memory can be physically
present, as when a listener monitors the speaker for accuracy in a
conversation. In other instances, it can be implied, as when some-
one reads written material. For reading, the source of the memory
is the“author”of the material. SS-RIF differs from WI-RIF because
in the latter case, the experimenter instructs participants to retrieve
particular memories. Speakers or authors, when discussing the
past, are, by definition, retrieving memories. Their listeners or
readers, however, are not obligated to retrieve a memory along
with the speaker or author. If they retrieve overtly, they are no
longer a listener, but a speaker. If they retrieve covertly along with
the speaker, it is entirely a choice that they alone have made. What is
perhaps surprising is that listeners and readers appear to make the
effort to concurrently, covertly retrieve in many instances, thereby
manifesting SS-RIF.
Studies of SS-RIF, especially those involving written mater-
ial, would suggest that selective practice1 of medical information
might induce forgetting for unpracticed, but related informa-
tion. The result would be a hierarchy of accessibility, with the
practiced information most accessible, the unpracticed, and unre-
lated to the practiced information moderately accessible, and the
unpracticed information related to the practiced information least
accessible. Our claim is that these differences in accessibility have
consequences for the final medical decision. For instance, a per-
son with back pain may initially learn about the advantages and
disadvantages of two treatments, steroids and acupuncture, but
may encounter only the advantages of the steroid treatment as
they continue their search. They may also fail to encounter any
information about acupuncture, given, perhaps, its “alternative-
medicine” status. If SS-RIF is at work, they should in the end have
more difficulty remembering the disadvantages of steroid treat-
ment than the disadvantages of acupuncture. This difference in
accessibility could affect their decision about which treatment to
pursue.
The relation between RIF and decision-making has proven dif-
ficult to establish. Storm et al. (2005), for instance, found that
RIF for positive and negative attributes of target individuals did
not affect participants’ impressions of the targets, at least as mea-
sured by likeability ratings. On the other hand, Iglesias-Parro and
Gomez-Ariza (2006) found that the selective practice of previously
studied material about job candidates influenced participants’
employment judgments, but only in certain circumstances.
In the present study, we examined for the first time the rela-
tion between SS-RIF and medical decision-making. In Experiment
1, we determined whether we could find SS-RIF for medical
information. As we noted, when reading, simultaneous retrieval
of relevant memories is optional. SS-RIF will only occur if
covert concurrent retrieval occurs (Cuc et al., 2007). We therefore
wanted to determine, before proceeding to our questions about
RIF and decision-making, whether selectively presented med-
ically relevant material induced forgetting in previously learned
medical information. Participants first learned about a fictitious
disease, Wheeler’s syndrome, including the advantages and dis-
advantages of treatment options. We chose to use as our stim-
ulus material a fictitious disease because we wanted to avoid
any effect prior knowledge might have had on memory. Other
researchers have employed a similar strategy for similar rea-
sons (e.g., John and Fischhoff, 2010). We sought to make the
disease as realistic as possible by modeling it on known dis-
eases. Participants then read a brochure that presented informa-
tion selectively. The pamphlet discussed some treatments, while
ignoring others, and stressed either advantages or disadvantages
for these discussed treatments. A final recall test followed. The
results of Experiment 1 should establish that the act of read-
ing selectively presented information can induce forgetting in
1Selective practice in this context refers to selectively searching through different
sources of medical information. In this search we are re-exposed to parts of pre-
viously learned information, while other parts either related or unrelated to the
re-exposed one remain unmentioned.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 72 | 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coman et al. Memory accessibility and medical decision-making
initially encoded memories that are related to the practiced
information.
Experiment 2 explored the more critical issue of whether the
SS-RIF observed in Experiment 1 will influence decision-making.
In order to understand this dynamic, we added a final decision-
making task at the end of the experiment. Importantly, for Exper-
iment 2 we changed the design of the material so as to exclude
the possibility that retrieval practice effects might account for the
final decision, thereby limiting any possible mnemonic effects to
SS-RIF.
In both experiments, participants are asked to imagine that
they are helping a friend make a decision. We could have asked
participants to imagine that they had the described disease, but we
reasoned that it might seem more realistic to participants to imag-
ine that they were helping a friend with the described disease make
a decision. People often experience medical decisions as stressful
(Loewenstein, 2005; Luce, 2005) and, thus, besides receiving a doc-
tor’s opinion, they might consult with family and friends and rely
on them for gathering treatment relevant information (Srirangam
et al., 2003; Boehmer and Babayan, 2005).
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-four undergraduate New School students received
research credits for experimental participation. Data from two
participants was discarded because in the debriefing phase of the
study, they reported skepticism about the existence of the disease.
Materials
We constructed a 180-word description of Wheeler’s syndrome.
We made the information included in the description as plausi-
ble as possible by keeping close to syndrome descriptions in The
Merck Manual, a widely used manual for diagnosis and treat-
ments of medical disorders (Beers et al., 2006). Its definition,
its prevalence and incidence were presented on one PowerPoint
slide and its stages on another slide. On the third slide, par-
ticipants learned information about Laura, whom participants
were instructed to view as their fictional best friend. Four treat-
ment options were then presented, in a random order, in a series
of PowerPoint slides, one option per slide. On each slide, there
was the name of the treatment, in bold type (e.g., Propionic,
Metabotropic, etc.) and immediately below three advantages and
three disadvantages, although they were not labeled as such. In
fact, their benefits or costs were specific to the fictional friend
the participants had learned about. For instance, the assertion
that one treatment could be taken along with antacid medica-
tion was viewed as an advantage because Laura took antacid
medication. The advantages were always framed “positively,” e.g.,
“The treatment can be taken by people with stomach problems.”
(Laura has stomach problems.) Disadvantages were framed “neg-
atively,” as in “The treatment causes side effects for people with
kidney problems.” (Laura has kidney problems.) The form of
the statement (whether it was an advantage, and thus positively
framed or a disadvantage, and thus negatively framed) will be
treated as a Valence factor in this experiment. Three evaluators
analyzed each item of information included in each of the four
treatments on the following dimensions: (a) salience of the items
(e.g., whether some items were more salient and more likely to
be easily remembered compared to others), and (b) relevance of
items for Laura’s case (e.g., whether some items were more rele-
vant to her medical profile compared to others). Items evaluated
as more salient and/or more connected to Laura’s medical pro-
file were discarded and replaced by new items. This pilot work
indicated that participants should find each treatment – with
its respective advantages and disadvantages – equally memorable
and relevant for Laura’s case. The advantages always preceded
the disadvantages, but were otherwise randomly presented on the
slide.
We chose to present advantages first for two related reasons.
First, we wanted to avoid possible framing effects. Specifically,
people tend to be more receptive at selecting treatment options
when they are presented in a positive frame (Moxey et al., 2003).
If we had varied the order, we might have built in biases that
would have been difficult to compensate for, even with appropri-
ate counterbalancing. Second, our decision reflects what we believe
is the decision of many authors of medical brochures and Internet
sites. A survey of medical websites indicated that most begin a
description of a treatment with advantages, leaving the disadvan-
tages to last. Indeed, it would seem odd to most people to begin a
description of a treatment by articulating its disadvantages.
“Additional practice”was given with a brochure about Wheeler’s
syndrome. It contained a title page, which announced the disease’s
name and the sponsoring institution. The second page contained
the same description of the disease presented during the origi-
nal study phase. The third, and last, page described the treatment
options, but selectively and in a random order. The top of the
third page contained instructions asking the reader to indicate
in the brochure whether each item under the treatment labels
below would best be viewed as an advantage or a disadvantage.
The treatments then followed. Two of the four initially presented
treatment alternatives were presented, and for both of these treat-
ments, either only the advantages or only the disadvantages were
discussed. Participants were asked to indicate for each of the six
statements whether they could be viewed as either an advan-
tage or a disadvantage. These subjective judgments conformed
to our classification 99% of the time. Which of the treatments
were practiced was counterbalanced. To this end, we created four
brochures.
This selective presentation of treatments with advantages or
disadvantages allowed us to create Rp+, Rp−, and Nrp items.
(The advantages or disadvantages presented in the brochure were
Rp+; the non-mentioned advantages or disadvantages that were
part of the same treatments with those mentioned were Rp−; and
the advantages and disadvantages of the unmentioned treatments,
Nrp.) Valence will refer to whether the Rp+ items were advantages
(Positive Valence) or disadvantages (Negative Valence). Thus, page
3 contained two treatment options, with a total of either six advan-
tages or six disadvantages. If Rp+ items were advantages, the Rp−
items were disadvantages, and vice versa.
As to the description of Laura, it consisted of a 391-word pro-
file. The inclusion of a target individual allowed the participant
to understand the advantages and disadvantages as they apply to
Laura. The profile indicated that Laura was recently diagnosed
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with stage II Wheeler’s Syndrome and included age, personal
information, as well as medical history.
Design and procedure
All material was presented on an iMac computer. Participants
first read the PowerPoint slides describing Wheeler’s syndrome,
each presented for 80 s. Then, Laura’s profile appeared on the
computer screen for 100 s. The screen then turned blank and par-
ticipants were given 15 four-item forced choice recognition probes
to test whether they remembered the information about Laura.
The experimenter corrected any errors in the recognition test in
front of the participants. The presentation of the four treatment
alternatives commenced. Each treatment slide appeared on the
computer screen for 45 s. Participants were then asked to peruse
the brochure, which constituted the selective practice phase. They
were given 7 min to do so. Finally, participants completed a cued
recall for the advantages and disadvantages of the four treatments,
with the name of the treatment serving as cue. There were 5 min of
distraction between each phases of the experiment (see Figure 1
for a summary of experimental phases for Experiment 1).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To examine the effect of reading the brochure on memory acces-
sibility, we first undertook two repeated measures analyses of
variance (ANOVA), one for the practice effect (Rp+>Nrp)
and another for the induced forgetting effect (Nrp>Rp−). For
the practice effect, when the advantages were mentioned in the
brochure, we compared the proportion of the remembered Rp+
items out of the total number of Rp+ items with the propor-
tion of remembered advantages of the Nrp treatments out of the
total number of advantages of Nrp treatments (thereby comparing
advantage with advantage in the final recall test). Similarly, for the
induced forgetting effect, when the advantages were mentioned in
the brochure we compared the proportion of the remembered
Rp− items (related but unmentioned disadvantages) with the
proportion of remembered disadvantages of the Nrp treatments
(allowing us to compare disadvantages with disadvantages in the
final recall). A similar comparison procedure was followed for both
the practice and induced forgetting effects when disadvantages,
instead of advantages, were practiced (see Figure 2).
For each ANOVA, there was one between-subject factor,Valence
(whether advantages or disadvantages were practiced, we will use
the terms positive and negative, respectively, to refer to the two) and
one within-subject factor, Retrieval Type (Rp+ vs. Nrp or Rp− vs.
Nrp). For the practice effect, we failed to find any significant main
effects: Retrieval Type, F(1, 18)= 2.26, p= 0.15, η2p = 0.11, and
Valence, F(1, 18)= 0.14, p= 0.72,η2p = 0.00. Nor did we find a sig-
nificant interaction,F(1,18)= 0.02,p= 0.89,η2p = 0.00. As for the
presence of SS-RIF, our main interest, we found a significant main
effect for Retrieval Type, F(1, 18)= 4.23, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.19, but
not for Valence, F(1, 18)= 0.34, p= 0.57, η2p = 0.02. The interac-
tion was also not significant, F(1, 18)= 2.45, p= 0.14, η2p = 0.12.
We are not the first to find RIF in the absence of a practice effect
(e.g., Storm et al., 2006). There is no a priori reason why the two
must be connected in that they may involve different mechanisms.
For instance, practice effects could involve the strengthening of a
trace; RIF, the inhibition of a related trace. For SS-RIF, it is the
retrieval of an item that triggers the processes that lead to induced
forgetting, not the strengthening of the trace associated with the
retrieved item (Anderson et al., 2000).
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that reading selectively presented
medical material induced forgetting for unmentioned, but related
information. Can this SS-RIF influence subsequent medical deci-
sions? Of course, a practice effect could also affect decision-
making by making the practiced items more accessible when the
final decision is made. The experimental design of Experiment
1 does not allow us to disentangle easily practice and SS-RIF
effects on a subsequent treatment decision. Inasmuch as our
interest is the impact of SS-RIF on decision-making, in Experi-
ment 2, we designed the material so that any contribution of a
practice effect to the final treatment decision became irrelevant.
FIGURE 1 | Phases of Experiment 1, for the PositiveValence
Condition. In the Study and Selective practice phases, R stands for
relevant information; Rp+ for retrieval practice plus; Rp− for retrieval
practice minus, and Nrp for no retrieval practice. In the Negative Valence
condition, participants selectively practiced relevant disadvantages for two
of the four treatments.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 72 | 4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coman et al. Memory accessibility and medical decision-making
FIGURE 2 | Recall proportion for Rp+/Nrp and Rp−/Nrp items in
Experiment 1, for the PositiveValence Condition (advantages received
selective practice) (on the top), and the NegativeValence Condition
(disadvantages received selective practice) (on the bottom). In the
Positive Valence Condition, we compared Rp+ items (advantages) with Nrp
advantage items, and Rp− items (disadvantages) with Nrp disadvantage
items. Similarly, in the Negative Valence Condition, we compared Rp+
items (disadvantages) with Nrp disadvantage items, and Rp− items
(advantages) with Nrp advantage items.
Specifically, the selective practice brochure was rewritten so that
it only covered material irrelevant to Laura’s case (e.g., “It can
be taken by people who are allergic to aspirin,” is irrelevant
because Laura is not allergic to aspirin). The related, unmen-
tioned information was, however, relevant (e.g., “It may have
side effects for patients who have kidney problems,” is relevant
because Laura has kidney problems). We wanted to examine
whether practicing irrelevant material could have the potential
to decrease the accessibility of related, unmentioned information,
which could, in turn, affect decision-making concerning Laura’s
treatment.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-eight graduate and undergraduate New School students
participated in the experiment for class credit. Participants were
divided evenly between the Test-Present and Test-Absent condi-
tions and within these divisions, between the Positive and Negative
Valence conditions.
Materials and design
The description of Wheeler’s syndrome was the same as in Exper-
iment 1. Similarly, each of the four treatments presented in
the study phase included three advantages and three disadvan-
tages, for a total of six items per treatment. Unlike Experiment
1, each advantage or disadvantage appeared on its own Pow-
erPoint slide. Although in Experiment 1 all the advantages or
disadvantages were relevant to Laura’s case, in Experiment 2, a
statement (be it an advantage or a disadvantage) could be rel-
evant or irrelevant. We constructed four types of statements:
irrelevant advantage, irrelevant disadvantage, relevant advantage,
and relevant disadvantage. The statement “The treatment is rec-
ommended to people with Lupus” was irrelevant because Laura
doesn’t have Lupus and an advantage because it contains an
inclusion criterion. A variant of the above statement – “The
treatment is not recommended to people with Lupus,” – was
an irrelevant disadvantage because, although Laura doesn’t have
Lupus, the statement involves an exclusion criterion. On the other
hand, the statement “The treatment can be taken by people with
stomach problems” is both relevant (Laura has stomach prob-
lems) and an advantage, in that it contains an inclusion criterion.
Finally, the statement “The treatment cannot be taken by peo-
ple with stomach problems” is a relevant disadvantage because
it contains an exclusion criterion. In what follows, we use the
terms positive and advantage, as well as negative and disadvantage,
interchangeably.
As for the brochure used in the practice phase, as in Experi-
ment 1, only two treatments were included, with only the three
irrelevant statements mentioned for each treatment. There were
four brochures. Two of the brochures mentioned only the irrel-
evant advantages of the two treatments (constituting one set of
brochures) and were given to participants in the Positive Valence
Condition. The other two mentioned only the irrelevant disadvan-
tages of the two treatments (constituting the second set) and were
given to participants in the Negative Valence Condition. For each
of the sets of the two brochures, which treatments were mentioned
was counterbalanced, so that in one brochure Treatments 1 and 2
were mentioned, while Treatments 3 and 4 went unmentioned. For
the other brochure in a set, Treatments 3 and 4 were mentioned,
while Treatments 1 and 2 went unmentioned. Participants did
not know that the mentioned information was irrelevant, inas-
much as, in Experiment 2, Laura’s profile was presented toward
the end of the experiment, in the decision-making phase, and
the information is relevant or irrelevant only in the context of
Laura’s profile. The brochure had the same format as the brochure
used in Experiment 1. Just as in Experiment 1, participants were
asked to indicate for each of the six statements in the brochure
whether they can be viewed as an advantage or a disadvantage.
These subjective judgments conformed to our classification 94%
of the time.
As to Laura’s profile, it was similar to what was used in Exper-
iment 1, with only slight stylistic changes. Unlike in Experiment
1, the profile was presented at the end of the experiment, when
participants had to make a treatment decision, because we wanted
to ensure that participants carefully read the material during the
practice phase, which they might not have if they deemed it
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irrelevant. People will often search for information on a disease
of a friend before they know the details of her medical history.
Design and procedure
Participants first read the PowerPoint presentation about
Wheeler’s syndrome. They then read a presentation of the
four treatment alternatives. Each item from each treatment was
presented on a separate slide. For counterbalancing, half of the
participants were exposed to four treatments containing three
irrelevant advantages and three relevant disadvantages. In a mir-
ror image pattern, the other half of the participants was presented
with four treatments containing three irrelevant disadvantages and
three relevant advantages.
After a distracter task, participants were given the brochure and
asked to read it carefully. Half of the participants were given the two
types of brochures designed for the Positive Valence Condition;
the other half, the brochures designed for the Negative Valence
Condition. Participants were given 7 min to read the brochure. As
in Experiment 1, after another distracter task, in the Test-Present
condition, participants completed a final recall test. They were
given 10 min to complete it. The Test-Absent condition dropped
the final recall test and extended the distracter task by 10 min. This
control eliminated any potential effect that the final recall might
have on decision-making. After the recall test or the extended dis-
tracter,participants received a hard copy of Laura’s profile and were
asked to choose the best treatment alternative for their friend’s
medical condition. They had as long as they wished to make a
decision. See Figure 3 for a summary of experimental phases of
Experiment 2.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As in Experiment 1, we first wanted to establish whether reading
the brochure resulted in practice and SS-RIF effects. Here we exam-
ined the proportion of Rp+, Rp−, and Nrp items remembered in
the final recall test of the Test-Present (experimental) condition.
We then explored the relation between memory accessibility and
decision-making.
Retrieval effects
We undertook two repeated measures ANOVA with Valence
(whether irrelevant advantages or irrelevant disadvantages were
practiced) as a between-subject factor, and Retrieval Type (Rp+
vs. Nrp or Rp− vs. Nrp) as a within-subject factor. Just as in Exper-
iment 1, the recall proportion in the final recall test served as the
dependent variable. As in Experiment 1, we compared the recall
proportion of Rp advantages with the recall proportion of Nrp
advantages, and similarly, we compared the recall proportion of
Rp disadvantages with the recall proportion of Nrp disadvantages
(see Figure 4). For the practice effect, we only found a signifi-
cant main effect for Retrieval Type, F(1, 22)= 22.87, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.51. There was no significant main effect for Valence,
F(1, 22)= 2.22, p= 0.15, η2p = 0.09, or for the interaction, F(1,
22)= 0.71, p= 0.71, η2p = 0.03. That is, unlike Experiment 1,
for which we did not find a practice effect, both advantages and
disadvantages benefited from additional rehearsal here.
For the induced forgetting effect, we found significant main
effects for both Retrieval Type, F(1, 22)= 8.61, p< 0.01, η2p =
0.18, and Valence, F(1, 22)= 4.45, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.17. There was
no significant effect for the interaction between Retrieval Type
and Valence, F(1, 22)= 3.48, p= 0.08,η2p = 0.13. Importantly, we
replicated Experiment 1 by finding SS-RIF.
One explanation for the observed induced forgetting effect is
the output interference hypothesis, according to which impair-
ment arises because the recalled Rp+ items interfere with the
recall of Rp− items (Anderson and Spellman, 1995). As a test
of this possibility, we followed Macrae and Roseveare (2002;
see also Barnier et al., 2004) and ranked the Rp+ and Rp−
items according to the order in which they appeared in each
participant’s final recall, with the lower ranking indicating an
earlier recall. We then averaged the rankings for recalled Rp+
and Rp− items. We performed an ANOVA with Retrieval Type
(Mean Rank Rp+ vs. Mean Rank Rp−) as a within-subject
factor and Valence as a between-subject factor. We found nei-
ther significant main effects, nor a significant interaction (all
FIGURE 3 | Phases of Experiment 2, for the PositiveValence condition. In
the Study and Selective practice phases, R stands for relevant information; I
stands for irrelevant information; Rp+ for retrieval practice plus; Rp− for
retrieval practice minus, and Nrp for no retrieval practice. In the Negative
Valence condition, participants studied irrelevant disadvantages (the negatively
stated version of irrelevant advantages) and relevant advantages (the
positively stated version of relevant disadvantages) for each treatment, and
selectively practiced irrelevant disadvantages for two of the four treatments.
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FIGURE 4 | Recall proportion for Rp+/Nrp and Rp−/Nrp items in
Experiment 2, for the PositiveValence Condition (irrelevant advantages
received selective practice) (on the top), and the NegativeValence
Condition (irrelevant disadvantages received selective practice) (on the
bottom). R stands for relevant, and I stands for irrelevant. In the Positive
Valence Condition, we compared Rp+ items (irrelevant advantages) with
Nrp advantage items, and Rp− items (irrelevant disadvantages) with Nrp
disadvantage items. Similarly, in the Negative Valence Condition, we
compared Rp+ items (irrelevant disadvantages) with Nrp disadvantage
items, and Rp− items (irrelevant advantages) with Nrp advantage items.
p’s> 0.20), which means that the induced forgetting effect is
not due to the interference caused by the selective recall of Rp+
items.
Decision-making
As to the effect of SS-RIF on the decision about Laura’s treatment,
we undertook two separate analyses. In the first one, we classified
the decisions as to whether they were consistent or inconsistent
with what was assumed to be forgotten after reading the brochure.
For example, if participants read a pamphlet about irrelevant
advantages of some, but not all treatments, they would subse-
quently have difficulty accessing relevant, related and unmen-
tioned disadvantages. As a result, according to the SS-RIF model,
the disadvantages of those treatments discussed in the brochure
should be less accessible than the disadvantages of the unre-
lated and unmentioned treatments. Inasmuch as the design of
our stimulus material ensured that we can discount any influence
practice might have on subsequent decision-making, then, in the
present example, participants should prefer the mentioned treat-
ments, in that their disadvantages are relatively inaccessible. Along
similar lines, when irrelevant disadvantages are practiced, the rel-
evant, related, and unmentioned advantages should subsequently
be less accessible than the relevant advantages of the unrelated and
unmentioned treatments. In such an instance, participants should
prefer the treatments that were not discussed in the brochure
because their advantages are more accessible. Inasmuch as we
failed to find a difference in the frequency with which participants
made a SS-RIF-consistent decision in the Test-Present and Test-
Absent conditions,χ2(1)= 0.097, p= 0.76, we combined the data
from these two conditions. Thirty-three out of 48 participants
made RIF-consistent decisions, a proportion greater than chance
(using a sign test, p< 0.02).
The second analysis offered a refinement over the first analysis,
in that it examined whether SS-RIF-consistent decisions are more
likely as SS-RIF impairment increased. We now focused solely on
data from the Test-Present condition. We calculated the size of SS-
RIF impairment [(Nrp) – (Rp−)] and the practice effect [(Rp+) –
(Nrp)] and then used these scores in a binary logistic regression
to test whether these two scores predicted SS-RIF-consistent deci-
sions. We did not expect that the practice effect should make a
contribution, inasmuch as the experiment was designed to make
practice effects irrelevant. We did expect to see a contribution of
SS-RIF impairment. Confirming the hypothesis, a binary logistic
regression employing a forward conditional model excluded the
practice effect, but included SS-RIF impairment as the only sig-
nificant predictor, χ2(1, N = 24)= 5.46, p< 0.02; β= 4.45, odds
ratio (OR)= 85.65, Wald= 4.01, p< 0.05.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study had two aims: (1) to determine whether SS-RIF can be
observed as a consequence of reading information about a medical
treatment, and (2) whether any observed SS-RIF can potentially
affect subsequent decision-making. Regarding the first aim, both
experiments clearly showed SS-RIF. As we noted in the introduc-
tion, the concurrent, covert retrieval underlying SS-RIF is optional.
When a person reads about the advantages and disadvantages of
treatments in a brochure, they do not need to remember silently
any memories they have previously formed about the treatment.
The current findings indicate that they do. Moreover, they retrieve
what is mentioned in the brochure, but, as the presence of SS-RIF
indicates, what they retrieve may inhibit the unmentioned related
item. This finding underscores an important cost associated with
selective presentation, even for medically relevant information.
As to the second issue addressed in this paper, the results indi-
cate that socially shared RIF is a potential mechanism by which
memory accessibility can affect decision-making, at least when
the decision depends on the accessibility of precise information.
By focusing on induced forgetting, our research adds substan-
tially to previous efforts exploring how memory accessibility crit-
ically contributes to medical decision-making by exploring the
effects of prior exposure on memory and on subsequent decisions
(Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et al., 2003; see also
Baines et al., 1990; Erskine et al., 1990). To be sure, practice effects
might also contribute, but the design of Experiment 2 eliminated
any possible contribution of a practice effect, thereby highlighting
the contribution of SS-RIF. How practice and induced forgetting
might interact to lead to a final decision in situations where both
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could play a role will, of course, depend on the relevance of the
practiced and forgotten information to the target individual. There
is no a priori reason to believe that practice effects trump the
effects of induced forgetting. For instance, people may be aware of
the role of practice and compensate for its influence when making
the final decision. They are less likely to be aware of the role of
induced forgetting, especially the different pattern of forgetting
for unmentioned related over unrelated information. As a result,
they might be less likely to adjust for the contribution of SS-RIF.
Several caveats are in order. We need to be cautious about
making any general statement, inasmuch as we employed only
one example of a disease. However, on the surface, there was
nothing extraordinary about our description of Wheeler’s Syn-
drome. When we asked our participants, in the debriefing phase,
to indicate whether Wheeler’s syndrome seems like something
a friend might develop under some unfortunate circumstance,
97% responded in the affirmative. Moreover, we cannot be certain
whether SS-RIF can drive decision-making if there is a substantial
delay between selective practice and the final decision. Some stud-
ies suggest that impairment can last no more than 24 h (MacLeod
and Macrae, 2001), whereas other studies find RIF after a week
(Conroy and Salamon, 2006; Migueles and Garcia-Bajos, 2007;
Tandoh and Naka, 2007; Garcia-Bajos et al., 2008; Storm et al.,
2012). It is worth noting that even the shorter time frame may
still be relevant to decision-making, especially if decision-making
occurs in increments, with new or tentative decisions being made
as new information is acquired (Johnson et al., 2005; Weber and
Johnson, 2006).
In instances when the decision-maker has enough time to con-
sider all advantages and disadvantages while reading a brochure or
scanning the internet, selective retrieval might result in retrieval-
induced facilitation for the unmentioned and related medical
information (Chan et al., 2006). In these situations we suspect
that treatment decisions will be driven by the resultant increase in
accessibility. Future research should explore the effects of retrieval-
induced facilitation, as well as the conditions that might induce
facilitation over forgetting.
In the studies presented in this paper advantages always pre-
ceded disadvantages. The rationale for this decision was to avoid
potential framing effects and to keep treatments’ presentation as
ecologically valid as possible. However, further research should
also explore whether the order of presentation has a significant
impact on RIF.
Finally, in these experiments, participants were asked to make
a treatment decision for another individual. Memory accessibility
may be impacted differently when the decision is made for self
vs. for a significant other. There is some research to support this
concern. For instance, decisions made for another individual can
induce a higher sense of responsibility in the surrogate, resulting in
a preference for more conservative options (Raymark, 2000). This
observation, however, does not imply that SS-RIF would only play
a role in surrogate decision-making. There is no a priori reason
why it would also not apply to self-relevant decision.
The research provides a cautionary note about the risks of
decision-driven selective retrieval of medical information. When
exposed to medical information, like reading a brochure, talking
with a doctor, or watching a commercial, the results here suggest
that beyond a simple practice effect, selective remembering can
induce forgetting for unmentioned, related, and relevant informa-
tion. This induced forgetting could influence medical decision-
making in not necessarily positive ways. When patients and signif-
icant others read incomplete information from brochures, Internet
entries, or just simply listen to a commercial on the TV, these acts
might, in the end, be more detrimental than informative for the
decision-making process. A broad implication at the policy level of
this research would be for medical providers to include complete
and comprehensive information in pamphlets and Internet entries
so that patients and their significant others are fully informed when
making or advocating for medical decisions.
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